January 2025
MUHAMMAD TEHSEEN IMM-3167-24 2025 FC 55 JANUARY 10, 2025
In 2025, Muhammad Tehseen, a Pakistani citizen applied for a work permit, but his application was rejected. The Officer claimed that the Applicant lacked sufficient experience as a meat cutter. The Officer’s GCMS notes indicate that this conclusion was reached solely on an unclear hiring date in an undated letter signed by a possible business partner from Tehseen Meat Shop. However, several sources contradict this judgement, namely the Applicant’s application form, his resume, statutory declaration to the letter from his co-owner and statements from store customers. Each of these sources provides information to negate the Officer’s determination that the Applicant was inexperienced. As such, the application was allowed.
LANXI PENG IMM-1419-24 2025 FC 2 JANUARY 2, 2025
In 2025, Lanxi Peng applied for permanent residency, but experienced significant delays from IRCC in her application. The Court states in Jia 2014 FC 596 that all relevant circumstances must be considered when determining whether a delay is unreasonable, including IRCC’s average processing times. In this case, the Applicant’s PNP application remained undecided for nearly four years, more than three times the posted average processing period.
IRCC was required to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay but failed to do so. Although IRCC confirmed receipt of all necessary documents between August and December 2023, it still did not justify the prolonged processing time of the PNP application. The only relevant updates the Applicant received came from the MP and OINP. IRCC not only failed to provide a satisfactory justification but offered almost no reasoning at all (Conille at para 23).
The Respondent claimed that the lengthy delay was justified due to the Applicant’s “lengthy immigration history”. However, the court finds this reasoning insufficient, given the Applicant’s straightforward immigration background. She had two study permits denied on technical grounds in 2014, and her refugee claim was rejected along with her work permit application in 2019.
Furthermore, the Applicant was not given precise information about the pending status of her eligibility and criminality assessments, nor was it clear whether her security assessment had begun. These explanations were inadequate for the delay in the Applicant’s case. Justice Gador concurred with Justice Gascon, who stated that delays related to pending security assessments are not satisfactory.
“The integrity of the immigration system” is not only based on inadmissibility decisions, as other objectives of the statutory framework are outlined in subsection 3(1)] of IRPA. The Applicant correctly observes that the delay in this case undermines the main objectives of IRPA, including family reunification, consistent standards, timely processing and fair procedures (IRPA, ss 3(1)(d), 3(1)(f), 3(1)(f.1)). Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the Applicant’s potential inadmissibility had been thoroughly reviewed.
Both the Applicant and her mother experienced significant emotional and physical distress due to the unreasonable delays in the application process. The delay has affected the Applicant’s career, causing it to stagnate. She also reported suffering from insomnia, hair loss, heart palpitations and cold sweats. Her mother also felt very anxious and had trouble sleeping as a result of being apart from her daughter for an extended period. The Applicant highlighted that her mother is her only immediate family member and has been waiting for a reunion since she submitted her application in March 2021. Furthermore, the Applicant stated that the challenges they faced while awaiting her PNP application have prevented her from working since April 2024. The court agrees with the Applicant that vacations do not constitute family reunification. Temporary reunions during vacations do not address the Respondent’s failure to uphold the objective of family reunification as outlined in paragraph 3(1)(d) of the IRPA. This is especially true since the goal is to reunite families in Canada, not through temporary visits abroad.
Overall, the excessive delay, the stress it caused the Applicant and her mother, and the conflict with IRPA’s objectives support the Applicant’s position. Thus, the balance of convenience rests with the Applicant in this case.
Almuhtadi v C.C.I., 2021 FC 712 confirms that IRCC’s authority to assess admissibility does not justify the delay, especially given the Applicant’s affidavit explaining its negative impact on her and her mother (para. 49). As a result, the court issued an order of mandamus, requiring IRCC to decide on the Applicant’s PNP application within 90 days. The application was allowed.
February
BRANDON FERRA IMM-9300-23 2025 FC 254 FEBRUARY 10, 2025
Given the Applicant’s previous overstay in Canada, the Officer unreasonably concluded that he would fail to leave the country once his work permit expired. The Applicant remained in Canada longer because he believed that his TRV was valid when he submitted his Former Application and that it allowed him to remain in Canada until a decision was made. However, the Officer’s justification does not acknowledge this belief.
Furthermore, the Officer failed to consider in his conclusions that the Applicant departed Canada just three days after learning his Former Application was denied. The Officer’s reasoning does not clarify whether the Officer took into account the Applicant’s explanation for his overstay or his genuine belief that he was complying with the law. The Applicant’s prompt departure upon receiving the decision indicates his willingness to leave when required, contradicting the Officer’s conclusion. This warrants the Court’s intervention. Accordingly, the application is allowed.
JOSHUA LEE COINS IMM-2886-24 2025 FC 349 FEBRUARY 21, 2025
The Applicant’s relationship progressing from girlfriend to common-law spouse and having a child together does not inherently indicate that his stay in Canada is not temporary or that he would fail to depart at the end of an approved stay. The Applicant and his spouse each provided statutory declarations explaining his stay was temporary pending the outcome of a spousal sponsorship application. However, the Officer’s reasoning did not address these declarations but offered a conclusory decision instead.
Furthermore, the Applicant shows a positive immigration history. As a U.S. citizen, he had visa-free entry privileges but still followed proper legal procedures to maintain his temporary resident status. He initially entered Canada on March 25, 2022, on a visitor record valid until August 1st, 2022, and applied for an extension on July 28th, 2022 before it expired. When his status lapsed on May 10, 2023, he applied for status restoration within the 90-day period under s. 182(1) of the IRP Regulations. The Applicant’s record also indicates that he entered Canada at least once before on July 17th, 2021 after which he left Canada and returned using his visitor record on May 25th, 2022.
Justice Strickland agrees with the Applicant that he has consistently made an effort to maintain legal status in Canada, demonstrating a respect for the legal process. His travel history indicates compliance with Canadian immigration laws, supporting the likelihood that he would leave at the end of an authorized stay. However, the Officer failed to address this evidence, despite it being included in submissions from the Applicant’s Counsel and the Applicant’s statutory declaration. This evidence could have challenged the presumption that the Applicant intended to immigrate rather than stay temporarily.
The Officer does not offer an explanation as to why the approval of a spousal sponsorship at stage one, rather than just its submission, is relevant to the analysis. In the absence of a clear explanation or legal basis, the Officer appears to have improperly introduced a new requirement in assessing the restoration of temporary resident status. The application was allowed.
MD HOWLADER IMM-8941-23 2025 FC 274 FEBRUARY 12, 2025
Subsection 24(1) does not require “unique” reasons or circumstances for issuing a TRP. The only qualifications to the circumstances described in the subsection are that the Applicant be inadmissible or not meet the IRPA’s requirements, and the specific circumstance that subsections 24(2) to 24(7) outline, that do not lead to a TRP being granted.
Since Parliament deliberately identified certain circumstances that would prevent TRP issuance but did not include a uniqueness requirement, this implies that relief under subsection 24(1) is not restricted to exceptional cases. Instead, the provision grants decision-makers significant facts of each case. Given the flexibility of the mechanism, the threshold for granting relief may vary, provided that the decision is properly justified.
The Officer denied the Applicant a TRP due to a lack of unique or compelling reasons. However, requiring a unique reason was unreasonable, as TRPs can be granted in a wide range of circumstances. The Officer also failed to clearly articulate the need for a compelling reason, which may have been influenced by a mistaken belief that the Applicant had blatantly disregarded Canadian immigration laws. As a result, the decision was deemed unreasonable. The application was allowed.
ZHEFU ZHANG IMM-15961-23 2025 FC 294 FEBRUARY 14, 2025
The Officer did not respect procedural fairness because he did not warn Mr. Zhang that the credibility of his job offer was an issue. The fairness concern was not resolved by the reconsideration process since the Officer’s reasons are unclear if the matter was reopened to assess the new evidence.
The Officer undoubtedly made a credibility finding regarding Mr. Zhang’s job offer is not genuine. In this case, the Applicant is entitled to be aware of the case they must meet and be allowed to respond the the Officer’s credibility concern. The Officer’s breach of procedural fairness could have been fixed if the Applicant had the chance to respond during the reconsideration process. Mr. Zhang only became aware of the Officer’s credibility concerns two days after his application was refused. He then provided further evidence to resolve the Officer’s concerns with the job offer letter.
Boiles v CCI, 2024 FC 1063 explains that “the first stage of the reconsideration the process is whether the Officer will exercise their discretion and ‘open the door to reconsideration. The second step is to reconsider the decision on its merits if the Officer so decides” (Boiles at para 21).
The Officer provided limited reasons making it difficult to evaluate whether they considered the new documents provided or whether they simply refused to reopen the matter. The Officer’s lack of justification causes the decision to be unreasonable in any case. It also implies that the reconsideration process cannot remedy the Officer’s breach of procedural fairness since there was never a meaningful opening for the Applicant to respond to the credibility concerns. The Officer’s mention of the Applicant’s ability to reapply does not eliminate the obligation to give the Applicant an opportunity to respond to credibility concerns. The Officer must provide clear, transparent, and justified reasons for both the initial decision and the choice of whether to reopen the case.
PRAISE OBEHI ODOGBO IMM-12956-23 2025 FC 291 FEBRUARY 14, 2025
The Applicant argued that the Officer acted unreasonably by not allowing her to withdraw her request to enter Canada. However, the Canada Border Services Agency Examinations Manual states that granting a withdrawal is discretionary and typically applies in cases of accidental entry, which was not the case here. Additionally, once the Officer began preparing an inadmissibility report under s. 44(1) of IRPA, withdrawal was no longer an option. Given these factors, the court found no reason to question the Officer’s decision. As such, the application was dismissed.
March
EHAB HUSSEIN AL-TINAWI IMM-2862-24 2025 FC 398 MARCH 4, 2025
The Applicant’s inability to obtain a UAE police certificate resulted in his permanent residence application being denied. Not being able to receive a clearance certificate was the main reason why he sought a TRP. However, the Officer did not investigate any risk coming from the absence of a certificate.
The Officer claims that the inability to offer a police clearance certificate and the Applicant’s falling out status are not strong enough grounds to merit the issuance of a TRP and work permit. However, these were the Applicant’s reasons for applying for a TRP not the reasons for his request. Under s. 24(1), the Officer should have assessed whether any risk from the missing certificate outweighed the Applicant’s need to stay in Canada. The assessment was unreasonable because it failed to either determine that no risk existed (despite evidence showing no convictions or outstanding legal issues) or, if a risk did exist, to appropriately weigh it against the Applicant’s circumstances. While the Officer could have reasonably concluded that the Applicant’s reasons for staying were not compelling enough to override any risk, no such determination was made.
Justice Strickland finds several other issues with the Officer’s decision. The Officer acknowledges the UAE’s strict debt laws but also suggested that the Applicant should have been aware of them due to his time working and owning a business there. However, this contradicts the Officer’s own finding that the Applicant may not have been aware that his debt would prevent him from obtaining a police certificate, making the reasoning ambiguous.
Additionally, the Officer concluded that the Applicant disregarded Canadian immigration laws by staying after his work permit expired, treating this as a serious factor. Yet, it is unclear how this supports the Officer’s risk-versus-need analysis or provide justification in the specific circumstances.
The Officer concluded that the Applicant’s temporary separation from his spouse would not cause “irreparable harm” and that he could return if his H&C and permanent residence applications were approved. This reasoning is also unclear, as a temporary separation would seemingly support granting a TRP, which could be canceled if his applications were unsuccessful. The application was allowed.
STEPHANIE DWOMO OCRAN // IMM-7827-24 // 2025 FC 517 // March 20, 2025
Stephanie Dwomo Ocran, a Ghanaian citizen, applied for a Temporary Resident Permit to remain in Canada. Despite presenting substantial evidence such as deep community ties, a clean record, and her employer’s continued support, the Officer neglected to reference this compelling evidence, compounded by silence on whether the Applicant’s evidence presented “compelling reasons” as weighed against the risk posed by allowing the Applicant to remain in Canada. This decision also fails to address the Applicant’s central submission that a finding that she worked without status bars her from applying for a PGWP for 6 months, yet she is still required to apply for a PGWP within 6 months of finishing her studies. The Officer ignored or misunderstood the Applicant’s conundrum and simply noted that the Applicant could regularize her status from outside the country. The Court found the decision substantively unreasonable, as the Officer failed to engage with relevant evidence meaningfully and misapplied the assessment standard. Consequently, the application was allowed.
NADIA ZUHAIR SHIHAB // IMM-1074-24 // 2025 FC 482 // March 14, 2025
In 2023, Nadia Zuhair Shihab applied for permanent residence under Express Entry. When the application was rendered incomplete for being non-compliant with sections 10 and 12.01 of the IRPR, the Officer advised that the application “was not put into processing”. Although Ms. Shihab’s intentions and qualifications were not in doubt, the Court concluded that the Officer was working under transparent reasons and showed sufficient justification, as the Applicant’s Express Entry Profile was no longer in existence after the application was rendered incomplete and there was no active application to which a further document submitted afterwards could be applied. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
RODOLFO IDELFONSO // IMM-6937-24 // 2025 FC 392 // March 5, 2025
Mr. Idelfonso was found inadmissible to Canada because he didn’t mention a past criminal charge when asked. He had received a conditional discharge for the incident and believed he didn’t need to disclose it. However, the immigration officer decided that by not mentioning it, he had misled the government and closed off a line of investigation—even though the charge itself might not have made him inadmissible.
The court disagreed with how the officer applied the rules. The law says that for missing information to matter, it has to be important enough to actually affect the decision. But the officer didn’t consider whether Mr. Idelfonso’s omission would have changed the outcome or whether his mistake was understandable.The court decided the officer’s decision was unfair and unreasonable. The application was approved.
MONIKA STOJKOVA // IMM-15832-23 // 2025 FC 511 // March 19, 2025
Monika Stojkova, applied to enter Canada but was deemed inadmissible due to a prior foreign conviction for drug possession. The Officer cited that her conviction would be considered an indictable offense in Canada and thus met the threshold for serious criminality under section 36(1)(b) of the IRPA. Ms. Stojkova’s arguments sought to reargue the matter considered by the ID, rather than to focus on the ID’s reasons themselves, thus not meeting her onus of showing how those reasons lack intelligibility, transparency, and justification. The Officer’s decision was grounded in legal equivalency, without consideration of mitigating factors. The Court found the Officer’s decision to be legally correct and reasonably justified within the confines of the statute. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
ALGANESH SIUM TEDLA // IMM-5957-24 // 2025 FC 686 // April 14, 2025
During Alganesh Sium Tedla’s interview to enter Canada, there was no evidence provided from the IRCC Officer attesting to what occurred, nor the accuracy of the GCMS notes. The Officer cited that the applicant had made inculpatory admissions during her eligibility interview, such as her voluntary involvement with the EPLF, as recorded in the GCMS notes. However, these notes were not supported by an affidavit from the conducting Officer, and they contradicted Ms. Tedla’s sworn testimony attesting to the inaccuracy of the translation of her statement as recorded in the GCMS notes. Such standalone notes are not admissible to prove the truth of their contents, yet the ID erroneously accepted them as reliable evidence and attributed the “most weight” to them in their decision. The Court, which has repeatedly confirmed its preference for the sworn evidence of an applicant as to statements made at an interview that are unaccompanied by an affidavit, concluded that this decision constituted a fundamental error. Consequently, the application was allowed.
ANDRE GONZALEZ // IMM-11657-23 // 2025 FC 628 // April 7, 2025
Andre Gonzalez applied for a Canadian work permit, but was cited by an Officer to have committed material misrepresentation by submitting an application containing multiple inconsistencies. Mr. Gonzalez’s immigration representative candidly acknowledged these errors whilst responding to a PFL by clarifying that the inaccuracies were the result of hasty preparation rather than any intent to deceive. Despite this forthright admission, the Officer failed to engage with the innocent mistake exception established in immigration jurisprudence, which requires clear and convincing evidence, particularly given the gravity of a misrepresentation finding under section 40 of the IRPA. The Court found that the Officer’s refusal to consider the mitigating explanation offered by Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel rendered the decision unreasonable. Consequently, the application was allowed.
