January 2025
MUHAMMAD TEHSEEN IMM-3167-24 2025 FC 55 JANUARY 10, 2025
In 2025, Muhammad Tehseen, a Pakistani citizen applied for a work permit, but his application was rejected. The Officer claimed that the Applicant lacked sufficient experience as a meat cutter. The Officer’s GCMS notes indicate that this conclusion was reached solely on an unclear hiring date in an undated letter signed by a possible business partner from Tehseen Meat Shop. However, several sources contradict this judgement, namely the Applicant’s application form, his resume, statutory declaration to the letter from his co-owner and statements from store customers. Each of these sources provides information to negate the Officer’s determination that the Applicant was inexperienced. As such, the application was allowed.
LANXI PENG IMM-1419-24 2025 FC 2 JANUARY 2, 2025
In 2025, Lanxi Peng applied for permanent residency, but experienced significant delays from IRCC in her application. The Court states in Jia 2014 FC 596 that all relevant circumstances must be considered when determining whether a delay is unreasonable, including IRCC’s average processing times. In this case, the Applicant’s PNP application remained undecided for nearly four years, more than three times the posted average processing period.
IRCC was required to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay but failed to do so. Although IRCC confirmed receipt of all necessary documents between August and December 2023, it still did not justify the prolonged processing time of the PNP application. The only relevant updates the Applicant received came from the MP and OINP. IRCC not only failed to provide a satisfactory justification but offered almost no reasoning at all (Conille at para 23).
The Respondent claimed that the lengthy delay was justified due to the Applicant’s “lengthy immigration history”. However, the court finds this reasoning insufficient, given the Applicant’s straightforward immigration background. She had two study permits denied on technical grounds in 2014, and her refugee claim was rejected along with her work permit application in 2019.
Furthermore, the Applicant was not given precise information about the pending status of her eligibility and criminality assessments, nor was it clear whether her security assessment had begun. These explanations were inadequate for the delay in the Applicant’s case. Justice Gador concurred with Justice Gascon, who stated that delays related to pending security assessments are not satisfactory.
“The integrity of the immigration system” is not only based on inadmissibility decisions, as other objectives of the statutory framework are outlined in subsection 3(1)] of IRPA. The Applicant correctly observes that the delay in this case undermines the main objectives of IRPA, including family reunification, consistent standards, timely processing and fair procedures (IRPA, ss 3(1)(d), 3(1)(f), 3(1)(f.1)). Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the Applicant’s potential inadmissibility had been thoroughly reviewed.
Both the Applicant and her mother experienced significant emotional and physical distress due to the unreasonable delays in the application process. The delay has affected the Applicant’s career, causing it to stagnate. She also reported suffering from insomnia, hair loss, heart palpitations and cold sweats. Her mother also felt very anxious and had trouble sleeping as a result of being apart from her daughter for an extended period. The Applicant highlighted that her mother is her only immediate family member and has been waiting for a reunion since she submitted her application in March 2021. Furthermore, the Applicant stated that the challenges they faced while awaiting her PNP application have prevented her from working since April 2024. The court agrees with the Applicant that vacations do not constitute family reunification. Temporary reunions during vacations do not address the Respondent’s failure to uphold the objective of family reunification as outlined in paragraph 3(1)(d) of the IRPA. This is especially true since the goal is to reunite families in Canada, not through temporary visits abroad.
Overall, the excessive delay, the stress it caused the Applicant and her mother, and the conflict with IRPA’s objectives support the Applicant’s position. Thus, the balance of convenience rests with the Applicant in this case.
Almuhtadi v C.C.I., 2021 FC 712 confirms that IRCC’s authority to assess admissibility does not justify the delay, especially given the Applicant’s affidavit explaining its negative impact on her and her mother (para. 49). As a result, the court issued an order of mandamus, requiring IRCC to decide on the Applicant’s PNP application within 90 days. The application was allowed.
February
BRANDON FERRA IMM-9300-23 2025 FC 254 FEBRUARY 10, 2025
Given the Applicant’s previous overstay in Canada, the Officer unreasonably concluded that he would fail to leave the country once his work permit expired. The Applicant remained in Canada longer because he believed that his TRV was valid when he submitted his Former Application and that it allowed him to remain in Canada until a decision was made. However, the Officer’s justification does not acknowledge this belief.
Furthermore, the Officer failed to consider in his conclusions that the Applicant departed Canada just three days after learning his Former Application was denied. The Officer’s reasoning does not clarify whether the Officer took into account the Applicant’s explanation for his overstay or his genuine belief that he was complying with the law. The Applicant’s prompt departure upon receiving the decision indicates his willingness to leave when required, contradicting the Officer’s conclusion. This warrants the Court’s intervention. Accordingly, the application is allowed.
JOSHUA LEE COINS IMM-2886-24 2025 FC 349 FEBRUARY 21, 2025
The Applicant’s relationship progressing from girlfriend to common-law spouse and having a child together does not inherently indicate that his stay in Canada is not temporary or that he would fail to depart at the end of an approved stay. The Applicant and his spouse each provided statutory declarations explaining his stay was temporary pending the outcome of a spousal sponsorship application. However, the Officer’s reasoning did not address these declarations but offered a conclusory decision instead.
Furthermore, the Applicant shows a positive immigration history. As a U.S. citizen, he had visa-free entry privileges but still followed proper legal procedures to maintain his temporary resident status. He initially entered Canada on March 25, 2022, on a visitor record valid until August 1st, 2022, and applied for an extension on July 28th, 2022 before it expired. When his status lapsed on May 10, 2023, he applied for status restoration within the 90-day period under s. 182(1) of the IRP Regulations. The Applicant’s record also indicates that he entered Canada at least once before on July 17th, 2021 after which he left Canada and returned using his visitor record on May 25th, 2022.
Justice Strickland agrees with the Applicant that he has consistently made an effort to maintain legal status in Canada, demonstrating a respect for the legal process. His travel history indicates compliance with Canadian immigration laws, supporting the likelihood that he would leave at the end of an authorized stay. However, the Officer failed to address this evidence, despite it being included in submissions from the Applicant’s Counsel and the Applicant’s statutory declaration. This evidence could have challenged the presumption that the Applicant intended to immigrate rather than stay temporarily.
The Officer does not offer an explanation as to why the approval of a spousal sponsorship at stage one, rather than just its submission, is relevant to the analysis. In the absence of a clear explanation or legal basis, the Officer appears to have improperly introduced a new requirement in assessing the restoration of temporary resident status. The application was allowed.
MD HOWLADER IMM-8941-23 2025 FC 274 FEBRUARY 12, 2025
Subsection 24(1) does not require “unique” reasons or circumstances for issuing a TRP. The only qualifications to the circumstances described in the subsection are that the Applicant be inadmissible or not meet the IRPA’s requirements, and the specific circumstance that subsections 24(2) to 24(7) outline, that do not lead to a TRP being granted.
Since Parliament deliberately identified certain circumstances that would prevent TRP issuance but did not include a uniqueness requirement, this implies that relief under subsection 24(1) is not restricted to exceptional cases. Instead, the provision grants decision-makers significant facts of each case. Given the flexibility of the mechanism, the threshold for granting relief may vary, provided that the decision is properly justified.
The Officer denied the Applicant a TRP due to a lack of unique or compelling reasons. However, requiring a unique reason was unreasonable, as TRPs can be granted in a wide range of circumstances. The Officer also failed to clearly articulate the need for a compelling reason, which may have been influenced by a mistaken belief that the Applicant had blatantly disregarded Canadian immigration laws. As a result, the decision was deemed unreasonable. The application was allowed.
ZHEFU ZHANG IMM-15961-23 2025 FC 294 FEBRUARY 14, 2025
The Officer did not respect procedural fairness because he did not warn Mr. Zhang that the credibility of his job offer was an issue. The fairness concern was not resolved by the reconsideration process since the Officer’s reasons are unclear if the matter was reopened to assess the new evidence.
The Officer undoubtedly made a credibility finding regarding Mr. Zhang’s job offer is not genuine. In this case, the Applicant is entitled to be aware of the case they must meet and be allowed to respond the the Officer’s credibility concern. The Officer’s breach of procedural fairness could have been fixed if the Applicant had the chance to respond during the reconsideration process. Mr. Zhang only became aware of the Officer’s credibility concerns two days after his application was refused. He then provided further evidence to resolve the Officer’s concerns with the job offer letter.
Boiles v CCI, 2024 FC 1063 explains that “the first stage of the reconsideration the process is whether the Officer will exercise their discretion and ‘open the door to reconsideration. The second step is to reconsider the decision on its merits if the Officer so decides” (Boiles at para 21).
The Officer provided limited reasons making it difficult to evaluate whether they considered the new documents provided or whether they simply refused to reopen the matter. The Officer’s lack of justification causes the decision to be unreasonable in any case. It also implies that the reconsideration process cannot remedy the Officer’s breach of procedural fairness since there was never a meaningful opening for the Applicant to respond to the credibility concerns. The Officer’s mention of the Applicant’s ability to reapply does not eliminate the obligation to give the Applicant an opportunity to respond to credibility concerns. The Officer must provide clear, transparent, and justified reasons for both the initial decision and the choice of whether to reopen the case.
PRAISE OBEHI ODOGBO IMM-12956-23 2025 FC 291 FEBRUARY 14, 2025
The Applicant argued that the Officer acted unreasonably by not allowing her to withdraw her request to enter Canada. However, the Canada Border Services Agency Examinations Manual states that granting a withdrawal is discretionary and typically applies in cases of accidental entry, which was not the case here. Additionally, once the Officer began preparing an inadmissibility report under s. 44(1) of IRPA, withdrawal was no longer an option. Given these factors, the court found no reason to question the Officer’s decision. As such, the application was dismissed.
March
EHAB HUSSEIN AL-TINAWI IMM-2862-24 2025 FC 398 MARCH 4, 2025
The Applicant’s inability to obtain a UAE police certificate resulted in his permanent residence application being denied. Not being able to receive a clearance certificate was the main reason why he sought a TRP. However, the Officer did not investigate any risk coming from the absence of a certificate.
The Officer claims that the inability to offer a police clearance certificate and the Applicant’s falling out status are not strong enough grounds to merit the issuance of a TRP and work permit. However, these were the Applicant’s reasons for applying for a TRP not the reasons for his request. Under s. 24(1), the Officer should have assessed whether any risk from the missing certificate outweighed the Applicant’s need to stay in Canada. The assessment was unreasonable because it failed to either determine that no risk existed (despite evidence showing no convictions or outstanding legal issues) or, if a risk did exist, to appropriately weigh it against the Applicant’s circumstances. While the Officer could have reasonably concluded that the Applicant’s reasons for staying were not compelling enough to override any risk, no such determination was made.
Justice Strickland finds several other issues with the Officer’s decision. The Officer acknowledges the UAE’s strict debt laws but also suggested that the Applicant should have been aware of them due to his time working and owning a business there. However, this contradicts the Officer’s own finding that the Applicant may not have been aware that his debt would prevent him from obtaining a police certificate, making the reasoning ambiguous.
Additionally, the Officer concluded that the Applicant disregarded Canadian immigration laws by staying after his work permit expired, treating this as a serious factor. Yet, it is unclear how this supports the Officer’s risk-versus-need analysis or provide justification in the specific circumstances.
The Officer concluded that the Applicant’s temporary separation from his spouse would not cause “irreparable harm” and that he could return if his H&C and permanent residence applications were approved. This reasoning is also unclear, as a temporary separation would seemingly support granting a TRP, which could be canceled if his applications were unsuccessful. The application was allowed.
STEPHANIE DWOMO OCRAN // IMM-7827-24 // 2025 FC 517 // March 20, 2025
Stephanie Dwomo Ocran, a Ghanaian citizen, applied for a Temporary Resident Permit to remain in Canada. Despite presenting substantial evidence such as deep community ties, a clean record, and her employer’s continued support, the Officer neglected to reference this compelling evidence, compounded by silence on whether the Applicant’s evidence presented “compelling reasons” as weighed against the risk posed by allowing the Applicant to remain in Canada. This decision also fails to address the Applicant’s central submission that a finding that she worked without status bars her from applying for a PGWP for 6 months, yet she is still required to apply for a PGWP within 6 months of finishing her studies. The Officer ignored or misunderstood the Applicant’s conundrum and simply noted that the Applicant could regularize her status from outside the country. The Court found the decision substantively unreasonable, as the Officer failed to engage with relevant evidence meaningfully and misapplied the assessment standard. Consequently, the application was allowed.
NADIA ZUHAIR SHIHAB // IMM-1074-24 // 2025 FC 482 // March 14, 2025
In 2023, Nadia Zuhair Shihab applied for permanent residence under Express Entry. When the application was rendered incomplete for being non-compliant with sections 10 and 12.01 of the IRPR, the Officer advised that the application “was not put into processing”. Although Ms. Shihab’s intentions and qualifications were not in doubt, the Court concluded that the Officer was working under transparent reasons and showed sufficient justification, as the Applicant’s Express Entry Profile was no longer in existence after the application was rendered incomplete and there was no active application to which a further document submitted afterwards could be applied. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
RODOLFO IDELFONSO // IMM-6937-24 // 2025 FC 392 // March 5, 2025
Mr. Idelfonso was found inadmissible to Canada because he didn’t mention a past criminal charge when asked. He had received a conditional discharge for the incident and believed he didn’t need to disclose it. However, the immigration officer decided that by not mentioning it, he had misled the government and closed off a line of investigation—even though the charge itself might not have made him inadmissible.
The court disagreed with how the officer applied the rules. The law says that for missing information to matter, it has to be important enough to actually affect the decision. But the officer didn’t consider whether Mr. Idelfonso’s omission would have changed the outcome or whether his mistake was understandable.The court decided the officer’s decision was unfair and unreasonable. The application was approved.
MONIKA STOJKOVA // IMM-15832-23 // 2025 FC 511 // March 19, 2025
Monika Stojkova, applied to enter Canada but was deemed inadmissible due to a prior foreign conviction for drug possession. The Officer cited that her conviction would be considered an indictable offense in Canada and thus met the threshold for serious criminality under section 36(1)(b) of the IRPA. Ms. Stojkova’s arguments sought to reargue the matter considered by the ID, rather than to focus on the ID’s reasons themselves, thus not meeting her onus of showing how those reasons lack intelligibility, transparency, and justification. The Officer’s decision was grounded in legal equivalency, without consideration of mitigating factors. The Court found the Officer’s decision to be legally correct and reasonably justified within the confines of the statute. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
ALGANESH SIUM TEDLA // IMM-5957-24 // 2025 FC 686 // April 14, 2025
During Alganesh Sium Tedla’s interview to enter Canada, there was no evidence provided from the IRCC Officer attesting to what occurred, nor the accuracy of the GCMS notes. The Officer cited that the applicant had made inculpatory admissions during her eligibility interview, such as her voluntary involvement with the EPLF, as recorded in the GCMS notes. However, these notes were not supported by an affidavit from the conducting Officer, and they contradicted Ms. Tedla’s sworn testimony attesting to the inaccuracy of the translation of her statement as recorded in the GCMS notes. Such standalone notes are not admissible to prove the truth of their contents, yet the ID erroneously accepted them as reliable evidence and attributed the “most weight” to them in their decision. The Court, which has repeatedly confirmed its preference for the sworn evidence of an applicant as to statements made at an interview that are unaccompanied by an affidavit, concluded that this decision constituted a fundamental error. Consequently, the application was allowed.
ANDRE GONZALEZ // IMM-11657-23 // 2025 FC 628 // April 7, 2025
Andre Gonzalez applied for a Canadian work permit, but was cited by an Officer to have committed material misrepresentation by submitting an application containing multiple inconsistencies. Mr. Gonzalez’s immigration representative candidly acknowledged these errors whilst responding to a PFL by clarifying that the inaccuracies were the result of hasty preparation rather than any intent to deceive. Despite this forthright admission, the Officer failed to engage with the innocent mistake exception established in immigration jurisprudence, which requires clear and convincing evidence, particularly given the gravity of a misrepresentation finding under section 40 of the IRPA. The Court found that the Officer’s refusal to consider the mitigating explanation offered by Mr. Gonzalez’s counsel rendered the decision unreasonable. Consequently, the application was allowed.
RANJEET SINGH // IMM-6182-24 // 2025 FC 976 // MAY 29, 2025
In 2025, Ranjeet Singh applied for a Temporary Resident Visa to attend a job conference and visit his sister in Canada. The Applicant submitted a letter from his employer detailing the career development that would be gained from the international exposure encountered at the conference, a letter from his sister declaring her intent to let the Applicant stay with her in Calgary, and extensive financial documentation including proof of $389,419 in net assets and $39,735 available for his two-week trip. Despite this, the Officer concluded that there was a lack of funds and doubted the temporary nature of the Applicant’s stay without addressing the evidence contradicting the conclusion. The Court found the decision unreasonable, as the Officer’s reasoning was baseless. As such, the application was allowed.
ABDUL AWAL // IMM-12430-24 // 2025 FC 1024 // JUNE 6, 2025
In 2025, Abdul Awal applied to immigrate to Quebec. When asked to submit documents susceptible to demonstrate his intention to reside in Quebec from an open-ended list provided by authorities, the Officer found the Applicant’s responses regarding employment, housing, schooling for children, and knowledge of the area/native language lacking in detail or unfounded. The Applicant argued that the Officer wrongly assessed him, even though the Officer merely impartially requested evidence to substantiate his stated intent to live in Quebec. Consequently, the application was dismissed.
TRONG THUC MAC // IMM-13011-24 // 2025 FC 1046 // JUNE 11, 2025
Trong Thuc Mac applied for permanent residence in Canada based on Humanitarian and Compassionate (H&C) grounds, including family ties, health concerns, and adverse conditions in Vietnam. He also requested a Temporary Resident Permit on the same grounds as an alternative. The Officer rejected the application on the incorrect ground of requiring exceptional circumstances; the Court found this reasoning legally flawed, noting that “A decision is unreasonable if it requires that an Applicant demonstrate exceptionality as a condition for H&C relief.” Thus, the application was allowed.
SAQIB JAVED // IMM-11174-24 // 2025 FC 987 // JUNE 2, 2025
Saqib Javed applied for permanent residence in Canada, but received no response in 49 months- eight times the standard processing time. The Applicant thus sought judicial review, with the Court finding that IRCC failed to provide a meaningful explanation for this delay, particularly regarding a almost two-year gap in application processing activity revealed through GCMS notes. Moreover, the Respondent’s affidavit was from someone who had no direct knowledge of the Applicant’s application, and trust in IRCC’s security check times was not earned. The Court thus held that the unexplained delay was unreasonable, and a mandamus order was issued requiring IRCC to process the application within 90 days.
SETAREH RABIEI // IMM-13685-24 // 2025 FC 1295 // JULY 21, 2025
During Setareh Rabiei’s application for a visitor visa to Canada, the Officer used a boilerplate statement in the refusal letter without regard to the evidence before them concerning Rabiei’s family ties. The officer’s contention was that one’s spouse is always going to be a person’s strongest family tie, without considering the significant family ties one may have with parents, siblings, or extended family. Thus, this submission holds no foundation in the evidence before the Court. If the Court were to accept the officer’s argument, then any time an Applicant applies for a visa to visit a spouse in Canada, there would be no need for an Officer or Court to consider the Applicant’s family ties in their home country, as presumably their closest family ties are only to be found in Canada. As such, the application was allowed.
WANGCHEN LI // IMM-16529-23 // 2025 FC 1313 // JULY 22, 2025
Wangchen Li holds a bachelor’s degree in the English language, yet Li’s proficiency was questioned during her application to Canada. Even so, neither Li’s prospective employer nor the LMIA indicated a specific level of language proficiency. Without regard to Li’s bachelor’s degree, the Officer tried to corroborate that Li would not be able to perform the duties under her job. Given the inequitable evaluation, the application was allowed.
CANSU YARIMDAG // IMM-2811-24 // 2025 FC 1158 // JUNE 27, 2025
The Consultant handling Cansu Yarimdag’s extension application stated that the request had been filed a week before the PGWP deadline, when in fact this was untrue. Further regarding Yarimdag’s PR application, a refusal was issued months before Yarimdag was informed. During this period, the Consultant had stated that she would provide an update as soon as there was any movement. Although the Consultant’s license was revoked, the Officer was critical of Yarimdag’s efforts to maintain her status, not her attempts to restore her status once it had been lost. Therefore, the application was allowed.
SETAREH RABIEI // IMM-13685-24 // 2025 FC 1295 // JULY 21, 2025
During Setareh Rabiei’s application for a visitor visa to Canada, the Officer used a boilerplate statement in the refusal letter without regard to the evidence before them concerning Rabiei’s family ties. The officer’s contention was that one’s spouse is always going to be a person’s strongest family tie, without considering the significant family ties one may have with parents, siblings, or extended family. Thus, this submission holds no foundation in the evidence before the Court. If the Court were to accept the officer’s argument, then any time an Applicant applies for a visa to visit a spouse in Canada, there would be no need for an Officer or Court to consider the Applicant’s family ties in their home country, as presumably their closest family ties are only to be found in Canada. As such, the application was allowed.
WANGCHEN LI // IMM-16529-23 // 2025 FC 1313 // JULY 22, 2025
Wangchen Li holds a bachelor’s degree in the English language, yet Li’s proficiency was questioned during her application to Canada. Even so, neither Li’s prospective employer nor the LMIA indicated a specific level of language proficiency. Without regard to Li’s bachelor’s degree, the Officer tried to corroborate that Li would not be able to perform the duties under her job. Given the inequitable evaluation, the application was allowed.
SEYEDNASER MOOSAVI ET. AL. // IMM-17436-24 // 2025 FC 1577 // SEPTEMBER 25, 2025
Seyednaser Moosavi and his accompanying travellers applied for a Temporary Resident Visa for three months to visit their daughters. All Applicants were refused for the same reason; firstly, it was believed that their assets and financial situation were insufficient to support their stated purpose of travel, and secondly, there was suspicion that the Applicants would not depart after their authorized period of stay. These deductions were made despite the financial documents the Applicants submitted. The Officer did not state why the pension income statements, bank account summary statements, and title deed of a real estate property in the Applicant’s home country were insufficient to quell the doubts of admissibility. It should be noted that, in accordance with the IRCC guidelines, the Applicants did not provide six months of transaction history with respect to their bank accounts, but the Officer’s submission did not reflect this in their decision, and this fact should not bolster the reasons for the decision after the fact. The decision and the reasons provided by the Officer in this case were so minimal that the Court was not in a position to assess the reasonableness of the process. Thus, the application was allowed.
USMAN AHMED ET. AL. // IMM-14787-24 // 2025 FC 1449 // SEPTEMBER 2, 2025
Usman Ahmed applied for a work permit to work as an accounting technician or bookkeeper. In his application process, the Officer unreasonably focused on the lack of evidence regarding the Applicant’s work experience, even though no experience was required because Mr. Ahmed holds a university degree in accounting, in accordance with the National Occupational Classification category. At the hearing, Counsel for the Minister conceded that no experience was needed for an Applicant such as Mr. Ahmed. As a result, it cannot be concluded with any degree of certainty that the work permit would have been denied had the Officer not erred regarding Mr. Ahmed’s experience. Thus, Mr. Ahmed’s was allowed for judicial review, and his application was allowed.
GURVIR SINGH // IMM-15600-23 // 2025 FC 1520 // SEPTEMBER 12, 2025
Gurvir Singh applied for a Temporary Resident Permit, but was denied as he had the option of returning to India to regularize his status, and had not proven that he would experience difficulty using this option. These reasons provide a sufficient basis for refusing a Temporary Resident Permit, and consequently, a work permit. Thus, the application was dismissed.
THI NGUYEN ET. AL. // IMM-14521-24 // 2025 FC 1528 // SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
Thi Nguyen and his accompanying travellers applied for a Temporary Resident Permit, but during the process, were denied as the Officer failed to consider the Applicant’s alternative request for relief under section 24(1) of the IRPA. Failure to address a Temporary Resident Permit request made as an alternative request for relief in Ms. Nguyen’s H&C case is a breach of procedural fairness. The Officer conceded that failing to address the Temporary Resident Permit request was an error, and asked for a redetermination of only the Temporary Resident Permit request and not the H&C application. This request brings into question the intelligibility of the Officer’s reasoning and the process they followed. As well, it is difficult to envisage how a decision maker can determine whether H&C considerations are sufficient to warrant a waiver of inadmissibility without examining the nature of the inadmissibility in question. In Mr. Nguyen’s case, the Officer was making a medical inadmissibility finding with no engagement of the Applicant’s condition or treatment process. The Officer equated the situation the Applicant underwent in Vietnam, which was described as overcrowded and dirty, to Canada’s long wait times and development in treatments. This comparison of adverse country conditions was unresponsive to the Applicants’ evidence and, therefore, unreasonable. Thus, the application was allowed.
AMIR RASHEED // IMM-17442-24 // 2025 FC 1503 // SEPTEMBER 11, 2025
During Amir Rasheed’s application to Canada, the Officer appeared to have been satisfied that there was sufficient evidence adduced to reopen the file, resulting in a thorough re-examination of the Applicant’s file. Instead of engaging with the Applicant’s explanation and considering whether it provided a basis to reopen the file, though, the Officer merely reiterated the facts that were already known, which were all regarding a WES report. As such, the Officer’s “thorough” analysis equated to nothing more than circular reasoning. Thus, the application was allowed.
CHONGXIAO YANG // IMM-22177-24 // 2025 FC 1687 // OCTOBER 10, 2025
Chongxiao Yang applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) to support his daughter during her high school enrollment process. Since his application in June of 2022, Yang’s daughter graduated from high school, yet Yang still had received no firm updates on his application. In addition to his outstanding TRV application, Yang also had an outstanding permanent residence (PR) application under the Atlantic High Skilled program, which was filed with IRCC seven years ago in 2018. Yang’s PR application was responded to in 2025 by a procedural fairness letter sent by IRCC, raising concerns of inadmissibility pursuant to paragraphs 34(1)(a), (b.1), and (f) of the IRPA. It was alleged that Yang’s work as a police officer with the Economic Crime Investigation Brigade of the Bao’an Branch of the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau linked him to espionage or subversion. Yang responded to the letter detailing the nature of his employment, asserting that there exists no connection between his local policing role and any covert operations conducted by China’s Ministry of Public Security. Since Yang’s response over six months ago, there continued to be no decision regarding his PR application, and the Minister had not filed any evidence that speaks to the necessary length to conduct an inadmissibility determination, or any remaining steps that may need to be undertaken, raising concerns consistent with prior case law criticizing “bald assertions” about delays in security screening. With over seven years to examine inadmissibility concerns which were based on employment information disclosed in Yang’s 2018 PR application, a letter from the IRCC that relied on open-source materials from 2014-2015 regarding China’s operations, and no new evidence justifying continued delay, the Court found that the Minister had not provided a satisfactory justification for the massive delay in response. To ensure that the Minister has sufficient time to address any outstanding inadmissibility concerns, and in the absence of any specific timing issue raised by Yang, a mandamus order was issued for a decision to be rendered on the TRV application within 60 days. As such, the application was allowed.
ALI HABIBI // T-2508-24 // 2025 FC 1675 // OCTOBER 9, 2025
Ali Habibi came to Canada in 2014 on a student permit, became a permanent resident in 2020, and then applied for citizenship. 36 months later, no decision had been made on the Applicant’s application. For most of the period since Habibi submitted his citizenship application, IRCC’s processing standard has been 12 months, which has allegedly been reduced to 6 months. The ground for delay was stated to be that his security check was pending despite Habibi having undergone security checks to obtain both his student and permanent resident permits. After the security check was finally cleared, the Applicant’s criminality check had expired, and he needed to retake his fingerprints to complete an updated criminality check. Even then, the Respondent never requested updated fingerprints and a police clearance upon the expiry of the first one to mitigate further delay. During Habibi’s over 36 months of waiting for a decision, he made numerous status inquiries. IRCC continually advised that they were awaiting the completion of his security screening process, but the GCMS notes do not suggest that IRCC took active measures to resolve Habibi’s security concerns, nor did they provide an explanation of the delay, timeline for finalization, or any issues regarding any other admissibility. This is exactly the type of unexplained inaction that the Court in Jebelli (at para 21) and Almasi (at para 18) found could not justify prolonged delay. The Respondent’s argument that security checks were being handled by a partner agency, such as CSIS, did not absolve them of discharging the public duty they owed to Habibi as noted in Conille; as such, IRCC cannot rely on the fact that they outsourced their statutory duties as a justification for delay or to escape accountability. These delays have resulted in detrimental effects on Habibi’s professional life, as many positions in his field of civil and environmental engineering are best done through the National Research Council or through other public service jobs, where Canadian citizens are favoured. This led him to accept a position in the United States while his wife and two young children continued to reside in Canada. The Respondent argued that this was Habibi’s choice, which cannot tilt the balance of convenience in his favour. Realistically, Habibi’s choices became limited because of the Respondent’s unexplained delay; thus, the Respondent cannot reasonably rest their balance of convenience argument on an expectation that Habibi must bear the cost of any arbitrary and unexplained delays, therefore becoming a mandamus issue. Only on the day of Habibi’s hearing did the Court hear that the security check had been passed. The Court’s decision in Gichura v C.C.I. applies in Habibi’s application decision; the salient point of Gichura was the significant delay that did not appear to be due to particular complexities, but rather as a result of unexplained and lengthy periods of inaction. Therefore, while costs are highly unusual in immigration cases, Habibi had special grounds to be awarded reparations. The application for mandamus was granted with costs of $1,500 in favour of Habibi. It was decided that upon completion of the updated criminality check, the Respondent will notify Habibi of the result of the criminality check within 30 days of receipt of the updated criminality check. Following, a decision on the Applicant’s citizenship application will be rendered as soon as possible, but no later than 60 days from the date the Respondent receives the result of the criminality check.
CBANCISM: COSTS GRANTED FOR USING AI
An article on generative artificial intelligence (GAI) was written in the Praeventio newsletter, presenting five landmark Canadian cases in which lawyers had cited GAI hallucinations in the judicial process. Around the same time, a Superior Court judgment dated October 1, 2025, was published in legal databases. The decision addressed the use of GAI by a self-represented litigant and may represent Quebec’s first jurisprudential example on the issue. In this case, the party had incorporated GAI hallucinations into their arguments. The opposing counsel effectively submitted a table to the court listing eight instances of non-existent citations, decisions not rendered, irrelevant references, and inconsistent conclusions. The court thus ordered a payment of $5,000 for the breach of proceedings within Article 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This case highlights the essential role of lawyers as officers of the court and teaches key lessons for legal practice and professional liability prevention. All courts and members of the Quebec Bar must now deal with this new technology, which will inevitably have an impact on legal practice. Through these developments, law practitioners must remain committed to their ethical duties, as set out in the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.
TARLOCHAN SINGH // IMM-18822-24 // 2025 FC 1834 // NOVEMBER 18, 2025
Tarlochan Singh applied to Canada as a long-haul truck driver with unexplained traffic offences. Although these offences did not incur “black points,” the Officer made a reasonable determination on the grounds of insufficient evidence that the Applicant could not safely work. The decision was found to be well-founded in law, thus, the application was dismissed.
IBRAHIM ISSA // IMM-23194-24 // 2025 FC 1821 // NOVEMBER 14, 2025
Ibrahim Issa was asked if he had “…ever been refused a visa or permit, denied entry to, or ordered to leave any country or territory?” Issa answered “no” when in reality his 2018 visa application was neither granted nor refused by the US authorities; rather, it had been processing for the past 6 years. Under A40, GCMS identified this application as a non-disclosed adverse U.S. visa refusal, constituting a false declaration, potentially rendering the Principal Applicant inadmissible. It was also argued that a 6-year processing time was tantamount to a refusal, an argument that the Court could not agree to, as the passage of time is not a substitute for a visa refusal decision. As such, the application was allowed.
HAIJUN ZHANG ET. AL. // IMM-17254-24 // 2025 FC 1785 // NOVEMBER 6, 2025
Haijun Zhang and his accompanying travellers obtained their TRVs in August 2023 with the help of an agent whose contact was listed on file. After the TRV was issued, though, communication between the parties ceased, as the Applicants reasonably understood that their file was closed. Yet when the Consulate sent a Procedural Fairness Letter (PFL) email to the agent whose information was on the TRV file from a year ago advising that the Applicants had 10 days from the date of the letter to reply to the Officer’s concerns, the Applicants’ finalized TRV files were effectively reopened without ensuring that the Applicants themselves were notified. The Applicant’s wife was the first to become aware of the issue after encountering a visa problem at the airport on August 21, 2024. She went to the Consulate the following day and responded to the email on August 29, 2024. The Officer found the Applicants inadmissible for misrepresentation the following day. 10 minutes after this decision was rendered, the Consulate logged receipt of the Applicants’ response to the PFL, yet still chose not to reopen the file to consider the submission. Given the prejudicial consequences, the reasonableness of the Applicants’ lack of contact with the agent, and the fact that the agent had no ongoing responsibility once the application was finalized, the Officer should have afforded the Applicants an opportunity to provide the required document. Under these circumstances, the Officer’s decision denied the opportunity for procedural fairness, which is a fundamental principle that protects individuals from the arbitrary exercise of public power. Consequently, the application was allowed.
MOHAMMED SHAHZAD // IMM-16187-24 // 2025 FC 1999 // DECEMBER 18, 2025
Since at least 2013, Mohammed Shahzad had been living in Kuwait with two minor children under a temporary authorization that would expire in December 2025. In order to join his wife in Canada, he applied for an open work permit. Part of the process entailed filing evidence; Shahzad provided bank statements from his wife and himself, proof of ownership of an immovable property in India (in Shahzad’s case, vacant land), and a letter from his Kuwait employer. Shahzad did not provide evidence of his right and/or intention to renew his temporary residence status in Kuwait upon expiration. With the given documentation, his application was refused based on his significant family ties in Canada and the lack of permanent ties to Kuwait, raising the concern that Shahzad had more incentive to remain in Canada than to leave. To this, Shahzad refuted that there was no evidence that his job with his employers in Kuwait was in jeopardy, yet failed to meet this burden due to a lack of evidence, as his employer’s letter only speaks to a past employment record, not to any leave of absence being granted or a guaranteed job being offered upon return. As determinations of Visa Officers with respect to temporary work visas are afforded considerable deference, Shahzad bore the burden of demonstrating that he had sufficient incentive to leave Canada at the end of his authorized stay, a burden he failed to meet. Hence, the application was dismissed.
PREET DEVGON ET. AL. // IMM-23491-24 // 2025 FC 2005 // DECEMBER 18, 2025
Prior to the widespread use of Ministerial Instructions, immigration applications that were returned on the basis of incompletion were little more than administrative issues. Under Ministerial Instructions today, a finding of incompleteness completely expunges the Applicant’s invitation to apply. Once this invitation is erased, the Applicant is returned to a pool of tens of thousands of candidates, left to wait for a future invitation that is not guaranteed, during which time thresholds for invitation may change. Given the competitive and uncertain process in which severe consequences arise, the question becomes whether such determinations should be subject to judicial scrutiny, which is governed by the doctrine of justiciability.
Justiciability was intended to be a context-dependent concept focused on whether it is appropriate for a court to intervene in a given situation. It exists where the Court has both the authority and the capacity to review the issue, specifically whether the issue can be resolved according to “objective, judicially cognizable standards and evidence” (Sossin 2002, at 447). As justiciability depends on the nature and impact of the power being exercised, non-justiciability should not automatically apply to all cases involving non-compliance with Ministerial Instructions. The clarification in subsection 87.3(5) of the IRPA, which labels the return of an application as not a decision, does not change this, as legislatures cannot fully shield administrative action from judicial review, as the Supreme Court affirms.
In cases of returned immigration applications, the Federal Court has the judicial capacity to determine whether the return was reasonable and fair. Since Ministerial Instructions confer sweeping authority over the establishment, criteria development, cap imposition and moratoria, and conditions of programs prior to and during processing (IRPA, ss 10.1-10.4, 14.1, 87.3), extending non-justiciability to all Ministerial Instructions governed matters would effectively shield the majority of IRPA processing activities from Court oversight. This general application presents rule of law challenges because Ministerial Instructions are not statutory instruments, thus bypassing usual democratic processes such as public consultation and Parliamentary oversight. Although Parliament intended Ministerial Instructions to operate without typical front-end democratic inputs, this becomes an issue when judicial review is also limited; the lack of both democratic input and back-end court oversight permits executive action to operate without meaningful accountability.
In the case of Preet Devgon et al., the Officer returned the application as incomplete on the basis that the submitted CV contained chronological gaps. While a CV submission was required, under governing frameworks, it was never specified that the CV must contain no gaps. The officer, in essence, imposed a standard that did not exist in the law, making the return of the application for incompleteness an unreasonable exercise of discretion. Even so, IRCC argued that Devgon et al. were sent a Procedural Fairness Letter (PFL) asking for CVs with no gaps. While a PFL can support the refusal of an application on the basis of non-compliance pursuant to subsections 16(1) and paragraph 41 of the IRPA, a PFL is not an instrument legally authorized to define what a complete application is, and thus cannot be used alone to justify the return of an application that meets standards set in governing legal frameworks.
The case of Devgon et al. provides an example of the injustices that result when determinations of complete applications are treated as non-justiciable. Under approaches where courts are asked to deem such matters as beyond review, Applicants would have no recourse against unreasonable or legally unsupported determinations, amounting to an abdication of a court’s fundamental responsibility on judicial review. Thus, decisions to reject an application for incompleteness cannot be immune from judicial review where an Applicant disputes the determination that it is indeed incomplete. Devgon et al.’s application was ultimately allowed for judicial review.
